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Summary  findings
Michalopoulos analyzes current  trade policies and  weak operations in fundameintal market institutions
challenges  faced  by the  transition  economies-  inhibit  their  effective  intregration  into  the  world  trading
especially countries in the former Soviet Union - as they  system. These problems, together with persistent
are integrated into the world tradirng  system.  protective pressures, inhibit progress and accession to the
With few exceptions, transition economies in Central  WTO.
and Eastern Europe, including the Baltics, have been well  The remaining countries in Central Asia, as well as
integrated into the multilateral trading system. T heir  Belarus, have far to go in introducing market-oriented
trade regimes differ - and the main challenges they face  reforms and institutionis and the kind of trade
involve their integration into the European Union.  liberalization needed for integration into international
Integration into the multilateral trading systeml,  trade.
including progress toward memiibership  in the World  The countries of the forimer Soviet Union must make
Trade Organization  (WTO), varies significantly among  most of the reform and adjustment effort, but WTO
the other countries of the former Soviet Union. Armenia,  members must make changes as well - especially the
Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Moldova have  United States and the European Union. Both need to
adopted relatively liberal trade regimes and are either  review their policies toward noimarket  economies on
already members of the WTO or are close to it. These  antidumping practices and(  (in the European Union) on
four countries need to strengthen the capacity of broad  safeguards. Countr-ies  where market decisions prevail
market-based (especially trade-related) institutions,  should not be subjected to nontransparent  and arbitrary
including customs, the financial sector, and institutions  procedures. In particular, countries that have been
to facilitate trade.  judged to be "market" economies in the process of
The momentum for market and trade reform appears  gaining access to the WTO should be excluded from
to have stalled in some of the larger countries of the  procedures applied for antidumping and safeguard
former Soviet Union: Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine.  measures in nonmarket economies.
Their trade regimes are not especially restrictive, but
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statistical analysis and tables.THE INTEGRATION TRANSITION ECONOMIES  INTO THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM: SUMMARY
The study analyses current trade policies  and future challenges transition economies,
especially countries of the former Soviet Union (ESU), face in their further integration into the
world trading system.  It concludes that, with few exceptions, transition economies in Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE), including the Baltics, have become well integrated in the multilateral
trading system. While their trade regimes differ, the main challenges they face involve the future
integration with the E.U.
Integration in the multilateral trading system, including progress toward WTO accession,
varies significantly in the other ESU countries, Armenia, Georgia, and the Kyrgyz Republic and
Moldova have adopted relatively liberal trade regimes and either are already members or close to
gaining accession to the WTO.  The main challenges for these countries involve strengthening
the capacity of broad, market based institutions and those which are more specifically trade-
related, such as the financial sector, customs and trade facilitation, which would make them
better able to  enjoy the benefits and meet the responsibilities of participation in multilateral
trading system.
The momentum for  market and  trade reforms  in  some  of the  larger  FSU countries
(Kazakstan, Russia and Ukraine) appears to have stalled.  While their trade regimes are not
particularly restrictive, weakness in the operations of fundamental market institutions inhibit
effective integration in the trading system.  These problems, combined with persistent protective
pressures have inhibited progress and accession to the WTO.  The remaining countries in Central
Asia, as well as Belarus, have a long way to go in introducing market oriented reforms and
institutions as well as the kind of trade liberalization needed for  effective integration in the
international system.While the bulk of the reform and adjustment effort must be made by the FSU countries,
WTO members and especially their main trading partners, the US and EU, need to make some
changes as well.  Both need to review their policy regarding "non market economies" as it relates
to anti-dumping, and the EU case, safeguards, to ensure that countries where market decisions
prevail are not  subjected to  even more non-transparent and  arbitrary procedures than  those
associated with regular anti-dumping practices. In particular countries which have gone through
the WTO accession process can be judged to be "market" economies and should be excluded
from the "non-market" procedures applied in anti-dumping and safeguards measures.
iiTHE INTEGRATION OF TRANSITION ECONOMIES
INTO THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
I. Introduction
A country's trade policy is a key link in the transmission of price signals from the world
market to domestic resource allocation and to the economy's effective integration in the world
trading system. Thus, it is not  surprising that those countries in  Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE) and the former Soviet Union (FSU) wishing to escape the inefficiencies of  central plan-
ning and increase consumer choice, made trade policy reform an early and important component
of broader price and market oriented reforms.
Integration in the world trading system fundamentally depends on whether policies and
institutions are established in a country and its trading partners which are conducive to  the
mutually beneficial exchange of goods and services based on specialization and comparative ad-
vantage. Effective integration of the economies in transition thus, involves not only their own
trade policies and institutions  but also those of their trading partners which affect market access
and the terms of trade.
Integration involves abiding by the rules of conduct that govern the multilateral trading
system. These rules have been established and are being implemented in the  context of the
agreements administered by the World Trading Organization (WTO).These agreements include
trade in goods ( General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT), trade in services (General
Agreement for Trade in Services, GATS), as well as  other aspects of international exchange of
goods  and  services, such  as trade related intellectual property rights  (TRIPS), sanitary  and
phytosanitary  standards  (SPS),  govermment procurement etc.  The policies  and  institutions
governing these matters under  central planning were either radically different or  completely
lacking.  Thus, membership in the World Trading Organization is an essential element, perhaps
even a necessary condition for full integration in the world trading system.
1In the decade since the first major trade reforrns were introduced, countries in CEE and
the FSU have made giant strides in moving away from the autarkic trade regimes and distorted
trade patterns that characterized central planning. Some, especially in CEE, can be considered to
be genuinely and fully integrated in the world trading system. The experience in the FSU, where
reforms started a few years later, has been more varied.
The purpose of this study is to take stock of where countries in CEE and the FSU stand
regarding trade policy and their integration in the world trading system. The emphasis  is on the
present and future challenges facing these countries rather than on a historical review of their
reform efforts; and the focus is on the countries of the FSU where the remaining challenges are
the greatest.
The study is organized as follows: first, there is a short  review of trade policies during
the early period of transition and the resulting patterns of trade re-orientation in the countries of
CEE and the FSU. This is followed by a discussion of the present trade policy stance of these
countries. The next section focuses on market access issues,  especially for the FSU  countries
in the US and  EU. Finally, the problems and prospects of these countries' accession to the WTO
are discussed. The last section contains conclusions and recommendations on steps  transition
economies  and the international community should take to strengthen their integration into the
world trading system.
2II. Patterns of Trade Policy Reform in Early Transition
A. The CEE Countries'
The rapid reorientation of trade in the CEE countries towards the EU and OECD in the
aftermath of the breakup of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) has been
amply documented and discussed elsewhere ( Benton and Gros, 1997,  Kaminski et. al. 1996,
Kaminski,  1998). The CMEA  had created two broad kinds of distortions: First, by being a
largely closed system, it permitted  specialization and exports by firms and sectors which were
totally uncompetitive in world markets. 2 Second, it resulted in more intensive  trade among
members than would be justified  under market conditions as demonstrated by  a number of
studies, (Biessen, 1991; Havrylyshyn and Pritchett,  1991;Winters and Wang, 1993).
Following the breakdown in the CMEA arrangements during 1990 and the introduction
of a market basis for most international trade transactions, two kinds of broad adjustment were
needed in the CEE economies: firms had to adjust to international competition both in their own
markets and in their export markets in other CEE countries.3 This was combined with a reduction
in aggregate export demand as a consequence of the  systemic income and output  shocks caused
by the transition  in other CMEA countries-- especially in the former Soviet Union. The result of
these adjustments and the decline in CMEA demand was a rapid shift away from dependence on
trade with other CEE countries and the FSU and towards increasing trade with the rest of the
world, especially the EU and EFTA.
]Several countries  including  the  Baltics, Moldova  and Ukraine  that  emerged  as independent  in the
aftermath  of the  break-up  of the  Soviet Union  are  geographically  located  in Central  and  Eastern  Europe.
For analytical  purposes  however,  these  are considered  in the  FSUgroup,  while  the  CEE  designation  refers
to all others  in the area
2Examples  of such sectors  abound.  My  favorite one is the  Bulgarian  electronic  and computer  industry
which  employed  more than 100,  000  people and exported  perhaps  $2 billion to the CMEA  in 1987  which
almost  disappeared  completely  by 1991  (World  Bank, 1991).
3 The  CMEA  was  formally dissolved  in June 1991.
3CEE  countries  inherited  the  state  control  apparatus  and  the  relatively  low-but
meaningless under central planning-- tariff structures, which characterized central planning; and
the  heavily  protected,  through  administered controls  and  tariffs,  trade  regime  of  former
Yugoslavia. After eliminating the state control apparatus ( quickly in some cases-more  slowly
in  others,  e.g.  Bulgaria and  Romania),  CEE countries liberalized their trade  regimes  at a
different pace and to a different extent. Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia perhaps moved
the fastest and along a broader front; but Poland has reintroduced a certain degree of protection
(see below). Hungary, which had introduced some trade reforms in the 1980's, adopted a more
gradual pace. Trade reform in many countries suffered temporary setbacks, as a consequence of
macroeconomic instability which resulted in misaligned exchange rates and led to demands for
protection and, on several occasions, the reimposition of trade restraints. Czechoslovakia ( and
later Slovakia),  Hungary and Poland all introduced temporary import surcharges for a period in
the 1990's - only to abolish them after the exchange rates were realigned later on (Drabek and
Brada, 1998).
B.  The Baltics and Countries of the FSU
The situation in the Baltics and countries of the FSU has been vastly different and more
varied than in the CEE countries. Indeed, the rapid evolution of trade patterns and reform in the
Baltics has for some time now resulted in them facing much the same challenges and prospects
as the most integrated CEE countries.  Estonia is not only among the first group of countries
considered for EU expansion, but has one of the most, if not the most,  liberal trade regime in the
whole of Europe.
Other countries in the FSU have also made important strides in liberalizing their trade
policies and integrating in the multilateral trading system, although for a variety of reasons of
geography and politics, they have few prospects for close integration with Europe:  The Kyrgyz
Republic has a very liberal trade regime and recently became a WTO member (together with
Latvia). Similarly, Armenia, Georgia and Moldova have relatively liberal trade regimes and are
well advanced in their negotiations to become WTO members.
4At the  other extreme  there are several countries which have made little progress in
integrating in the world economy-and  indeed one or two which may have retrogressed in recent
periods. Included in this group are Belarus, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In between
are four countries, Azerbaijan, Kazakstan, Russia and Ukraine, which have made  progress in
liberalizing trade  but  which  face  a  variety  of  problems  that  have  restrained  their  fuller
integration in the multilateral trading system.
With the breakup of the Soviet Union in late 1991, all 15 countries started more or less
with the same state planning apparatus for the control of international trade: There were two
differences: the Baltics had already  jump started the reform process a little earlier and Russia was
much better endowed  both in human and natural resources than most others for making the
transition to a multilateral trading system.
From this common beginning, the patterns of trade policy soon diverged. The Baltics
quickly dismantled the state trading apparatus and especially Estonia and Latvia started shifting
their trade orientation to the European market economies. At the other extreme were countries
like  Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan  where,  as late as mid  1994, state organizations
continued to control the bulk of foreign trade. In between were countries like Russia, the Kyrgyz
Republic and Moldova, which introduced trade reforms early but  retained  a  significant but
declining role for the state in the control of key commodity exports (Michalopoulos and Tarr,
1994).
The key trade developments during this early period were the collapse of trade among the
15 FSU countries and the imposition of export controls on raw materials and energy. Table 1
shows the changes in the direction of trade for the 15 countries in the period  1991-1998 in US$
using market  exchange rates. Clearly a lot of the apparent decline in  1991-1993 was due to
exchange rate depreciation. But, there were large real declines in the  volume of trade among the
15 countries during this period as well, as shown in the Appendix.
5Russia's trade performance dominates the totals for the 15 countries taken together; and
its stagnating  exports in 1997-1998 result primarily from weakness in prices of energy and raw
materials , which account for the bulk of its exports. The Baltics and Russia were the countries
which reoriented their trade the fastest. While other countries (Belarus, Tajikistan) sustained
actual  declines in their exports to the rest of the world, which were in absolute terms less at the
end of the period than at the beginning (Table 1).
There  were several reasons for the decline in intra-FSU trade  during the early years of
the transition. Probably the most important was the collapse of the payments system. Also, some
trade, which was clearly uneconomical, collapsed from the introduction of foreign competition;
and  some  declines resulted from  conscious shifting of exports  of  raw materials,  especially
energy, away from countries in the FSU, which could not pay, and towards countries in the West
which could. Except for the Baltics, the main policy response to the trade decline at the time was
the establishment of a network of state trading agreements akin to the CMEA arrangements, as
well as the establishment of  a so called "free trade" area for the Comnmonwealth  of Independent
States (CIS). 4
Export controls were imposed on raw materials and energy  for several  reasons. First to
implement a shift in the direction of trade; and secondly, in order to keep domestic prices of
these inputs artificially low as a means of providing support to industrial users and consumers.
But export controls were also used by powerful industrial and energy interests to generate huge
rents in Russia, Ukraine and elsewhere (Aslund, 1999a and 1999b). On the import side, controls
were few: tariffs were typically low. But protection was provided through the highly depreciated
exchange rates, as well as through exchange controls.
As countries started to introduce their own currencies and stabilization programs started
to  take hold  in  1994-1996, and  as they also  initiated broader market  oriented  reforms, the
different trade regimes that are in place today started to  emerge. The transition  had  several
4 Michalopoulos  and Tarr,  1994  contains  a detailed  discussion  of trade  policies in these  countries
through  1994,  based  on seven  country  case studies.
6dimensions. First, real appreciation of the currencies occurred for certain periods and at various
times  in  different  countries, giving rise to  pressure for  protection through  more traditional
means-e.g.  through the introduction of differentiated tariff schedules. Second, export controls
on raw materials and energy were progressively dismantled. Third, the state trading agreements
that attempted to stabilize trade among the CIS countries were progressively abandoned. Efforts
continued however, to strengthen preferential arrangements
Table 1
Baltics and Countries of the FSU
Direction of Trade--Selected Years, 1991-1998
(millions of current US$ at market exchange rates)
Tablel  a:  Total  Trade
Former  Soviet  Union 1991  1993  1994  1996  1997  1998*
Countries
Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports  Exports  Inports  Exports  Inports  Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports
Armenia  3893  5516  153  347  257  469  203  856  233  892  262  879
Azerbaijan  9578  8261  993  1437  758  887  618  1256  781  794  910  1272
Belarus  24812  22332  3829  4125  3138  3680  5184  6896  7301  8689  7427  9124
Estonia  3886  3200  805  896  1304  1656  2077  3209  2929  4438  3207  4942
Georgia  5624  5286  517  893  242  469  264  890  230  931  285  1421
Kazakstan  15468  19495  4655  4845  3285  4170  6230  4477  6366  4275  5732  4374
Kyrgyz Republic  5186  5078  394  490  437  490  494  795  604  709  802  957
Latvia  6045  4843  1040  960  1027  1233  1424  2101  1664  2599  1882  3182
Lithuania  9613  6726  1625  1597.  2015  2339  3281  4404  3860  5644  4069  6366
Moldova  6370  6181  484  631  527  583  1119  1526  875  1164  1077  1426
Russia  161671  128433  59652  43646  66862  38661  89110  62278  87368  67619  76143  69745
Tajikistan  3880  5067  381  572  489  558  770  668  581  640  705  738
Turkmenistan  6460  4302  2887  1625  2176  1690  1693  1314  751  1228  888  1669
Ukraine  58098  72517  11969  13885  10191  11940  14441  18639  13842  17505  16186  19301
Uzbekistan  15018  16148  3551  3505  2320  2192  2672  4766  2948  4841  3089  5193
Former Soviet Union  335603  313385  92937  179452  95027  71018  129580  114075  127386  117128  119575  125396
7Table  l b:  Trade  among  FSU
Former  Soviet  Union 1991  1993  1994  1996  1997  1998*
Countries
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Ipports  Exports Imports Exports Ifports
Armenia  3823  4686  124  159  215  359  128  215  104  153  113  210
Azerbaijan  9091  7013  591  1036  398  612  313  332  381  357  480  388
Belarus  23151  20375  3092  3348  2085  2990  3815  4879  5482  6046  6542  7476
Estonia  3836  2996  343  244  574  405  810  651  711  934  868  1139
Georgia  5594  4806  295  433  156  280  164  234  137  341  139  415
Kazakstan  14285  16949  3126  3576  1958  2476  3590  2856  2848  2275  2944  2692
Kyrgyz Republic  5163  4293  282  378  325  402  386  498  349  417  445  422
Latvia  5920  4365  539  488  503  652  677  791  688  794  710  1109
Lithuania  9268  6251  929  1111  1160  1276  1864  1688  1294  2143  1402  2234
Moldova  6190  5525  303  452  406  449  854  888  629  612  713  671
Russia  108571  83333  15752  10546  15518  10987  20135  14700  19536  15095  19243  16715
Tajikistan  3456  4361  118  198  170  252  347  390  386  458  461  499
Turkmenistan  6314  3684  1731  876  1689  1002  1148  409  178  717  247  1059
Ukraine  149598  61217  J5669  9185  5543  7593  7414  9846  5754  9375  5976  8485
Uzbekistan  13761  14100 12085  2225  11408  1086  1217  2161  1674  1947  1740  1942
Former  Soviet Union  268022  1243954 134980  134253  132108  30821  42862  40538  40151  41663  42023  45455
Table  Ic:  Trade  with  the world  excluding  trade  among  FSU  countries
Former  Soviet  Union 1991  1993  1994  1996  1997  1998*
Countries  Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports  Exports  |Imports  Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports
Armenia  70  830  29  188  42  110  75  641  129  739  148  669
Azerbaijan  487  1248  402  401  360  275  305  924  400  437  430  885
Betarus  1661  1957  737  777  1053  690  1369  2017  1819  2643  885  1649
Estonia  50  204  462  652  730  1251  1267  2558  2218  3504  2340  3803
Georgia  30  480  222  460  86  189  100  656  93  589  146  1006
Kazakstan  1183  2546  1529  1269  1327  1694  2640  1621  3518  2000  2788  1682
Kyrgyz Republic  23  785  112  112  112  88  108  297  255  293  357  535
Latvia  125  478  501  472  524  581  747  1310  976  1805  1172  2073
Lithuania  345  475  696  486  855  1063  1417  2716  2567  3502  2667  4132
Moldova  180  656  181  179  1121  134  265  638  246  552  364  755
Russia  53100  45100  43900  33100  51344  27674  68975  47578  67832  52524  56900  53030
Tajikistan  424  706  263  374  319  306  423  278  195  182  243  238
Turkmenistan  146  618  1156  749  487  688  545  905  573  511  641  610
Ukraine  8500  11300  6300  4700  44648  4347  7027  8793  8088  8131  10210  10815
Uzbekistan  1257  2048  1466  1280  912  1106  1455  2605  1274  2894  1349  3251
Forner  Soviet Union  67581  69431  i57957  45199  62919  40197  86718  73537  87235  75464  77552  79941
* Estimate  based on data for  the first three quarters.
Source:  IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics 1994-1998.
Michalopoulos &Tarr 1991-1993.
8through,  for examnple,  the establishment of  a customs union among Belarus, Kazakstan, the
Kyrgyz  Republic  and  Russia  (BKKR)  in  1996. Finally,  as  countries  applied  for  WTO
membership, reforms started to be introduced to their trade and related regimes to bring their
policies and institutions in line with WTO requirements and obligations.
The very sharp  declines in trade among the FSU countries in the early part of the period,
appear to have been partly reversed later on, even in the Baltics-as  trade channels and some
financing were reestablished. But some of the increases in dollar values of trade in 1994-1996
resulted from real appreciation of the new currencies vis-a -vis the US$.
Table 2
Trade with the World, except FSU, as a Proportion of Total Trade, 1991-1998
in/%
Former  Sovied  Union 1991  1993  1996  1998*
Countries
Exports  Imports Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports
Armenia  1.8  15.0  19.0  54.2  36.9  74.9  56.5  76.1
Azerbaijan  5.1  15.1  40.5  27.9  49.4  73.6  473  69.6
Belarus  6.7  8.8  19.2  18.8  26.4  29.2  11.9  18.1
Estonia  1.3  6.4  57.4  72.8  61.0  79.7  73.0  7Z0
Georgia  0.5  9.1  42.9  515.  379  73.7  51.2  70.8
Kazakstan  Z76  13.1  32.8  26.2  42.4  36.2  48.6  38.5
Kyrgyz Republic  0.4  15.5  28.4  22.9  21.9  37.4  44.5  55.9
Latvia  2.1  9.9  48.2  49.2  52.5  62.4  62.3  65.1
Lithuania  3.6  7.1  42.8  30.4  43.2  61.7  65.5  64.9
Moldova  2.8  10.6  374  28.4  23.7  41.8  33.8  52.9
Russia  32.8  35.1  73.6  75.8  77.4  76.4  74.7  76.0
Tajikistan  10.9  13.9  69.0  65.4  54.9  41.6  34.5  32.2
Turkmenistan  2.3  14.4  40.0  46.1  32.2  68.9  72.2  36.5
Ukraine  14.6  15.6  52.6  33.8  48.7  4Z2  63.1  56.0
Uzbekistan  8.4  12.7  41.3  36.5  54.5  54.7  43.7  62.6
Former  Soviet Union  20.1  22.2  62.4  56.9  66.9  64.5  64.9  63.8
*Estimate based on data for first three quarters
Source: See Table 1
9Table 2 summarizes the information in Table 1 and shows some clear patterns emerging
in the direction of trade for various countries and groups. First, there is a group of countries
which includes the Baltics and the Caucasus countries which shifted their trade orientation away
from the  FSU  and towards the rest  of the world  early on  and  continued to  increase their
dependence on foreign markets and sources through the period. Second, there is another group,
which includes Kazakstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova and Ukraine which increased their
dependence  on  trade  with  the  rest  of  the.world  somewhat  less  rapidly,  but  also  quite
steadily.Then there is Uzbekistan which increased its dependence until 1996 but reduced it later.
Russia is,as in many other things, different. It increased its orientation to the rest of the world
very rapidly, from an already large base. But in  1998 the share of its trade with the rest of the
world as a proportion of the total was roughly the same as in  1993. Finally, Belarus is a case
totally to itself: its share of trade with the rest of the world was less in 1998 than in 1991.V
III. Trade Policies in the Late 1990's
A. The CEE Countries
The trade regimes that have evolved after a decade of reform in the CEE are characterized
by higher protection in agriculture and selected manufacturing sectors. Tariffs are typically low
in most  sectors, except  agriculture and consumer manufactures. Tariff exemptions are often
widespread and  sometimes non  transparent (Kaminski, 1999).  In manufactures, the tariff
regimes established have tended to provide higher protection  than in OECD countries; but not
siginificantly different than that provided by countries in Latin America.  Non- tariff barriers
(NTB) appear to  be  more prevalent in  Poland  and Hungary  and are  focused on  consumer
products. For example, Hungary has a global consumer goods quota affecting a variety of textile
and clothing products (except for WTO members), automobiles, and leather products (WTO,
1998). Poland's NTBs focus on motor vehicles, beverages and tobacco (Kaminski, 1999).
5 The trade statistics of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan  are  far  too unreliable to make ajudgement
about the evolution of their trade patterns over time.
10Protection of  agriculture, provided primarily through tariffs and tariff quotas,  is un-
even-but,  on the whole,  appears to be less than  what is provided by the EU. A number of
these countries are significant exporters of agricultural and agro-processing  industry products and
Hungary,  until  recently, was a member of the Cairns group of agricultural exporters in the
WTO. 6
While countries have introduced the necessary legislation, there has been practically no
recourse to trade remedies such as those provided by anti-dumping. Indeed,  with the exception
of Poland which initiated a number of antidumping investigations in 1991 (but did not actually
impose anti-dumping measures), no other CEE country appears to have  taken any other trade
remedies, including safeguard or countervailing duty actions (Miranda et. al. 1998).
The biggest challenge for most CEE countries, is future membership and integration with
the EU. EU membership would require the realignment of a vast number of their policies and in-
stitutions and give rise to  a large and complex set of social and economic adjustment issues,
which would include but not be limited to trade. It is a huge task which is currently occupying a
large number of policy makers and analysts both in the EU and in the countries themselves and is
a topic beyond the scope of this paper.
B. The Baltics and FSU
Throughout the 1990's the Baltics and countries of the FSU  pursued efforts to introduce
market oriented reforms as well as stabilize their economies  with different intensity and with
varying results leaving them with different challenges regarding their future integration in the
multilateral trading system.An effort is made here to summarize the trade policy stance of the
fifteen countries, recognizing that such an effort must by its very nature lead to generalizations
and  oversimplifications. Also, some reforms are in  process of  being implemented or being
reversed  at any point in time,  so the information  regarding policy is subject to  continued
6Hungary  perceived  that its Cairns  Group  membership  was incompatible  with  the impending
realignment  of its agricultural  policy related  to its accession  negotiations  with  the EU
11modification and updating.The discussion is organized by policy topic and attempts to identify
common themes as well as specific issues of importance to individual countries.
1. The Role of State Trading
Any discussion of trade policy in previously centrally planned economies must start with
a discussion of the residual role, if any,  of state kading entities whose operations may introduce
distortions in trade.  Progress on this front depends a great deal on two factors: the extent of
broader market liberalization; and the existence or not of  so-called "important" or "strategic"
commodities-whose  trade governments feel they need to control for one reason or another.
Considerable progress has been made on this issue in most countries.The Baltics have
liberalized their regimes completely, but so have a number of other countries, including the
Kyrgyz  Republic, Georgia, Armenia and Moldova-all  of which are not major exporters of
energy and raw materials. Some progress also has been made in countries like Russia where there
is only modest specific state involvement in terms of setting of prices or in the provision of other
special advantages to  state trading entities that may fall within the definition of state trading
enterprises that require to be notified under article XVII of the GATT.' A  review of the situation
in Russia in 1997 (Drebentsov & Michalopoulos, 1998) suggested that up to 26 % of Russian
trade turnover ( exports plus imports) may have been affected by enterprises involved in state
trading. The most important enterprises included GAZPROM, Almazyuvelir (diamonds) and
Roscontract. Subsequently some of these enterpises were to be privatized, leaving state trading to
account for perhaps 14-16% of total turnover, much conducted on commercial terms.
The main countries in which the state controls significant elements of the export sector
are Belarus, because of overall lack of progress in privatization, Uzbekistan (cotton), Azerbaijan
(oil), Tajikistan (aluminum) and Turkmenistan (gas and oil). The state trading activities in these
countries are also the main remaining instruments for regulation of exports-with  the exception
7 The working  definition  of enterprises  that  should  be notified  includes  " Government  and non-
governmental  enterprises  , including  marketing  boards,  which  have  been  granted  special  rights or
privileges, including  statutory  or constitutional  powers in the exercise  of which  they influence  through
12of licensing procedures involving products for health and  safety reasons and  environmental
protection. Of these five countries in which the state still plays an important role in controlling
exports, Azerbaijan is probably the only one in which  state control is not linked to  serious
economic distortions and where the state owned oil company operates on market terms.  In all
the rest,  state ownership or control of trade  involves distortions of one kind  or  another. In
Uzbekistan, state trade in cotton, has involved large penalties to cotton producers; in Tajikistan,
aluminum exports are not viable without huge electricity subsidies; in Turkmenistan domestic
pricing  decisions do not reflect market conditions.
2.  Tariff and Non-Tariff Measures on Imports
Broadly speaking tariffs in most countries do not provide for a large degree of protection,
although there is, of course, significant variation by country and sector. The Baltics, Armenia,
Georgia and the Kyrgyz Republic for example have low average tariff rates with relative little
dispersion, with  agriculture being protected more than manufactures. The WTO bound tariff
schedules of the Kyrgyz Republic and Latvia  average (unweighted)  6.7%  and  9.3 %  for
manufactures and 11.7% and 33.6 % for agriculture respectively (WTO, 1999b). Estonia had put
in place a trade regime with basically no tariffs but it has bound rates at higher ceiling levels
because of its prospective association with the EU (see below section V). For a time, the Kyrgyz
Republic had introduced a flat 10% tariff on all products-only  to have it modified as part of its
WTO accession negotiations.
The tariff schedules for Belarus, Russia and Kazakstan are very close to the Russian tariff
schedule,  because of the proposed customs union  among these  countries. Russia's  import
weighted  applied tariff rates average 13.6 % with highs of 50% in beverages. A recent study of
the Russian tariff suggested significant  tariff escalation only in a few sectors  (Tarr,  1998).
Ukraine's tariff schedule is similar with import weighted applied tariff rates averaging 11% and
weighted by domestic production 16% (Michaely, 1998).
their purchases or sales the level or direction of imports or exports (WTO, 1995)
13In all these countries, there is a variety of technical barriers to trade and a tendency for ad
hoc  policy-making. In  early  1999, for example, Kazakstan anounced increases of  200%  in
applied rates to  some coutnries and a ban on imports from Russia in an effort to  deal with
balance-of-payments problems related to the overvaluation of its exchange rate but repealed both
measures a few months later.
The Baltics and countries of the FSU also do not use extensively traditional non-tariff
measures such as licensing and quotas to control imports, outside of products  controlled for
health and safety reasons, environmental protection etc.  Several countries however, notably
Belarus, Turkmenistan , Uzbekistan and most recently Ukraine, have used foreign exchange
controls to limit imports in the context of balance-of-payments  problems.
With the exception of the Baltics however, very serious non-market barriers to trade of a
different kind exist in practically all other FSU countries. These relate to the general  weaknesses
of market supporting institutions, which appear to be pervasive but difficult to document  and
quantify systematically.
Weaknesses exist both in general, for example concerning enforcement of contracts and
property  rights;  as  well  as  in  particular  areas critical  to  international trade,  such  as  the
availability of trade finance and insurance, or the transparence of customs procedures. Because of
weaknesses in government and judicial system enforcement, there are  problems, even when the
laws and regulations are in conformity with international standards. Arguably, these weaknesses
in the market mechanism tend to discriminate more against foreign suppliers and imports-just
as they do against foreign investors. In the case of Russia, the federal structure of government
combined  with  weak  enforcement capabilities  also  gives  rise  to  another  set  of  problems.
Regulations regarding safety standards, labeling, and other potential technical barriers to trade
exist both at the federal and at the local level, giving rise to uncertainty regarding  which rules
apply or will be enforced ( OECD, 1999).
143. Trade Preferences
The Baltic countries, in this as well as in many other areas, have taken a very different
course  from the rest of the coutries in the FSU. From the beginning of the transition period their
orientation was away from the  FSU countries and towards Europe. This  led them to conclude
preferential arrangements, first bilaterally with the Nordic countries and EFTA, and ultimately
subsumed all these in the context of the Europe agreements.
The other FSU countries initially signed a  free trade arrangement (FTA) in the  CIS
context in  1992. This  was  followed by  a  number of  other agreements of  which the most
important for the present is the customs union agreement noted ealier by Belarus, Kazakstan , the
Kyrgyz Republic and Russia (BKKR) 8. The costs and benefits of this  arrangement as well as
other FTAs among FSU countries are discussed in Michalopoulos & Tarr (1997). In summary,
the conclusion from that analysis is that FTAs and customs unions among the CIS members are
likely  to be inimical to the future trade and growth prospects for participating countries: this is
in part because of the trade diversion costs entailed, but also, and perhaps most importantly,
because such arrangements tend to  lock in  place production based on  outmoded technology
based on central planning.
While  in principle, a free trade arrangement providing for  duty free treatment exists
among all CIS members, the coverage of the FTA regarding individual products tends to vary,
and it appears to be subject to extensive exemptions between different pairs of countries. On the
other hand, a free trade arrangement,  rather a customs union appears to be  in place for the
BKKR countries; and a customs union (with some exemptions) appears to be in place between
Belarus and Russia.  The language used  to  describe these arrangements is tentative  because
information, as to what is actually in place, is hard to come by and often contradictory.
Although the BKKR countries signed a customs union agreement in  1996, a common
external tariff was not fully agreed among the countries; and they decided to apply to the WTO
8 In early 1999, Tajikistan also agreed to  join this arrangement.
15as individual members with separate tariff schedules. Indeed, at present, the Kyrgyz Republic is a
WTO member with a separate schedule of tariff bindings and different applied rates than those of
the  other three  countries.  There are several differences in  the  applied tariff  rates  between
Kazakstan and Russia, while there appears to be a close link between the Belarus and Russian
tariffs.
Following the Kyrgyz accession to the WTO, Russia and Kazakstan complained that the
WTO  commitments made by the Kyrgyz violated the commitments they had  made to  their
customs union partners and would cause trade deflection, not only in goods but also in services,
in the light of porrous customs controls between Kazakstan and the Kyrgyz Republic (Gabunia,
1998).  The Kyrgyz authorities have engaged in consultations on this issue, but no definitive
solution appears in prospect in the near future. In April 1999,  the Kyrgyz Republic notified the
WTO of its participation in the customs union which it said will adopt a common external tariff
by 2003 (WTO, 1  999a). Given the commitments the Kyrgyz Republic has made in the WTO, it
would be very hard  for it to  maintain membership in  a customs union with  the other three
countries, unless the Russian tariff (which was intended to be the basis for the external tariff of
the customs union) is substantially modified.
C. Summary
While trade regimes and institutional capacities of CEE countries vary, the market basis
of their trade and the present and prospective institutional arrangements for its conduct suggest
that, in the field of international trade,  a large number of the CEE countries can be considered to
have successfully completed the transition to  a market oriented trading system, while several
others  are well  along the  way. The exceptions  are the conflict ridden countries  in  former
Yugoslavia and Albania.
The trade policy situation in the FSU countries is vastly different. At  one end of the
policy  spectrum, the  Baltics,  the  Kyrgyz Republic,  Armenia,  Georgia and  Moldova  have
established liberal trading ( and foreign exchange) regimes. At the other extreme, are Belarus,
16Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, where the trade regimes continue to be restrictive, in
good part because of the slow introduction of overall market reforms. In between, one finds the
remaining countries, Azerbaijan, Kazakstan, Russia and Ukraine.
It is interesting to compare the above grouping  to the most recent  EBRD ranking of
these countries according to its trade and foreign exchange system indicator as of 1998 (EBRD,
1998). This is done in Table 3, which also includes the EBRD ;ankings on enterprise governance
and competition. The last two columns show the EBRD ranking on foreign exchange and trade
regimes and  a ranking prepared by the author. The two rankings are quite consistent with the
exception of Kazakstan and Russia. In the latter's case, the EBRD seems to penalise Russia too
much for exchange restrictions it imposed on capital account. This leads Russia to have a lower
ranking on  this indicator than Tajikistan, which does not seem plausible. On the other hand, the
EBRD seems not to have taken into account the restrictions imposed (and recently lifted) by
Kazakstan. Also,  Estonia and Latvia as well as the Kyrgyz Republic,  probably have more
liberal trade regimes than Hungary, Poland and Romania.
Table 3
EBRD TRANSITION INDICATORS 1998
Progress in transition in Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic States and CIS
Countries  Governance &  Competition  Trade  &  Foreign  Exchange
Enterprise  Policy  System
restructuring
EBRD  EBRD  EBRD  Author
Albania  2  2  4
Armenia  2  2  4  4
Azerbaijan  2  1  3  3
Belarus  1  2  1  1
Bosnia and Herzegovina  2-  1  2
Bulgaria  2+  2  4
Croatia  3-  2  4  4
17Countries  Governance &  Competition  Trade  &  Foreign  Exchange
Enterprise  Policy  System
restructuring
Czech Republic  3  3  4+
Estonia  3  3-  4  4+
FYR Macedonia  2  1  4
Georgia  2  2  4  4
Hungary  +3  3  4+
Kazakhstan  2  2  4  3
Kyrgyzstan  2  2  4  4+
Latvia  3-  3-  4  4+
Lithuania  3-  2+  4  4
Moldova  2  2  4  4
Poland  3  3  4+
Romania  2  2  4
Russian Federation  2  2+  2+  3
Slovak Republic  3-  3  4+
Slovenia  3-  2  4+  -
Tajikistan  2-  1  3-  3-
Turkmenistan  2-  1  1  1
Ukraine  2  2  3-  3-
Uzbekistan  2  2  2-  2-
Source:  EBRD, Transition  Report 1998
IV. Market Access Issues
A. The CEE
With few exceptions (a number of former Yugoslavia republics, Albania), CEE countries
signed association agreements with the EU-which  involve free trade arrangements in  many
sectors and preferential treatment in others. The bulk of these countries' imports (over 70%) is
covered by  preferential European arrangements  and a  significant portion of  the remainder
involves energy and raw materials which are not protected. Indeed, these  countries seem to
18occupy the top of the EU preference pyramid (Stevens et.al. 1999). Four of the countries (the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) are among those under consideration for the
first eastward expansion of the EU and several more are included in the second group. While
individual CEE countries face specifc market access issues worldwide, because of the Europe
agreements  and because most are already members of the WTO, generally speaking,  CEE
countries  have far better access to markets worldwide by comparison to the countries in the
FSU,  which face unique problems discussed below.
B. The Baltics and FSU
When 15 countries emerged from the dissolution of  the Soviet Union, they inherited the
adversarial trade relationship that used to characterize that country with the OECD, including, for
example, lack of MFN treatment.  Matters changed quickly, however. First, the Baltic countries
and,  soon thereafter, almost all of the fifteen countries obtained MFN status, and some were also
extended GSP preferences in a number of OECD markets. 9 The path of the Baltics continued to
diverge from that of the other countries later on as well. The signature of the Europe agreements
provided them with preferential access in their  most important markets in Western Europe. On
the other hand, the remaining countries continued to face less favorable market conditions than
most of their competitors in the European and US markets.
It  should be  underscored that as many  of these countries' exports  to OECD markets
consist of energy and raw materials, which are not significantly protected, supply side constraints
rather than market access conditions were more important for overall export performance. There
are significant  problems, however,  in  specific  export sectors,  for example,  metals, textiles,
chemicals, and processed food,  some of which have their origin in the  cold war  and the
aftermath of central planning.
First, regarding access to  the European markets, while many of these countries have
signed bilateral trade agreements with the EU, they typically face the tariffs of the EU's GSP
9 For a discussion of market access issues during the early 1990's see Kaminski, 1994. Azerbaijan
has had difficulties in obtaining MFN status in the USfor reasons arising from its conflict with Armenia.
19which put them at the bottom of the EU preference pyramid, below the CEE, the ACP countries,
the "Mediterranean" agreements, the Andean pact etc. ( Stevens et. al. 1999). On some products,
the tariff differences are substantial: the average EU tariff on  ethyl alcohol is 30 percentage
points lower than what exporters from  Russia and Ukraine face.
In the US the problem is of a different nature. The MFN treatment extended by the US to
FSU countries, ( excluding the Baltics), as well as Albania, China and Mongolia is  contingent on
these countries' adherence to the provisions of the  Jackson- Vanik amendment to the  1974
Trade Act regarding freedom of emigration. Belarus and China are subject to annual waivers.
The rest have been found to be in full compliance and have received "permanent", conditional
MFN status. As long as the provisions of the act are in place however, the US can not legally
provide unconditional MFN status. This is an important issue which raises a number of problems
in connection with WTO accession for these countries, discussed below.
But perhaps the gravest market access problems  these countries face arise when the  EU
the  US  and  other countries  invoke trade  "remedies" against their  exports.  This  involves
primarily  anti-dumping actions, the most  common  (  and  legal  under  the  WTO)  means  of
protection in the late 1990's; and to a secondary extent, safeguard actions. The problems in these
areas arise in part because they are not members of the WTO. But in large part, they stem from
the fact that they  are still being designated  as "non market economies" in the determination of
antidumping and, in the case of the EU,  also for safeguard actions. The EU publishes annually a
list of "non-market" economies. The latest list (1999) includes Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, North Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Mongolia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan,  Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.  In the US, there is no formal list and the
decisions are made on a case by case basis, usually involving the same countries listed by the
EU. As  a consequence of this designation these countries face less transparent and potentially
discriminatory procedures against their exports.
Indeed,  there is evidence that both anti-dumping investigations and the imposition of
"definitive" antidumping duties is much more common against non-WTO members, especially if
20they are designated "non-market economies". Table 4 presents recent evidence from the WTO
data base on the frequency of  the initiation of anti-dumping investigations and the imposition of
definitive measures relative to countries' shares in world exports. The ratio of investigations or
definitive measures to the share of total trade (Rad) is a measure that shows the tendency of a
country's exports being subjected to antidumping actions relative to its share of world exports.
Table 4 shows that Rad is much higher for non-WTO members than for members for both
antidumping investigations and the imposition of "definitive" measures-usually  antidumping
duties.  It  also  shows that the so called non- market economies which are also not  WTO
members, including China, Russia and the rest of the FSU, except the Baltics,  are much more
likely to be the targets of antidumping investigations-which  themselves have been shown to
have an adverse impact on exports-relative  to their share in total world trade, by comparison to
any other group of countries, developed, developing or transition. And they are also even more
likely to be the targets of definitive anti-dumping duties.
Table 4
Antidumping:  Share of Affected Economies in Total Cases
Relative to Share in World Exports
(in % and ratios)
Affected Economies  Share in World  Share in Total  Share in Total  Rad  Rad  Definitive
Exports%  Anti-Dumping  Definitive Measures%  Investigations  Measures
Investigations%
1995-1997  1995-1997  1995-1997  1995-1997  1995-1997
WTO Members  87.7  73.4  63.9  0.8  0.7
Developed  61.9  34.1  21.7  0.5  0.3
Developing  22.7  34.4  36.1  1.5  1.6
Transition and Otlher  3.1  4.8  6.1  1.5  2.0
Non WTO  Members  12.3  26.6  36.1  2.2  2.9
Chzina  4.4  15.6  22.3  3.5  5.1
Other "Non  Market"  2.5  5.2  9.8  2.1  3.9
Other  5.3  5.8  4.0  1.1  0.7
Rad,  Share  in Investigations  (Measures)  /Share  in  World Exports
Source  WTO,  Trade  and  Antidumping  Data  Base,  Mirandaetal.  1998.
21Moreover, once the target of an investigation, the procedures used to determine whether
dumping has occurred in  "non-market" economies are usually different than those applied to
other  countries. Because  it  is assumed  that prices and  exchange rates  in  centrally planned
economies did not reflect true opportunity costs, "surrogate" or "analogue" countries' costs and
exchange rates are used for the determination of "normal" value, against which the actual price is
measured.  This  introduces  the  possibility  for  arbitrariness  and  non-transparency.  More
importantly, these procedures make it easier to induce exporters to  agree to minimum price
undertakings such as those concluded with Russia on uranium and aluminum (Michalopoulos
and Winters, 1997).
In the  context of safeguards, the EU  standards for  taking action against non market
economies are lower than for other countries, which are WTO members. In the case of non market
economies merely the coexistence  of higher imports and injury to domestic producers as opposed to
a causal link needs to be demonstrated; and there is no limit on the duration of the action, as
required by GATT article XIX, (Michalopoulos  and Winters, 1997).
With regard to  antidumping, the  WTO provides legal justification  for  such practices
through the reference of  Article 2.7 of the Antidumping Agreement to the second Supplementary
Provision to paragraph 1 of Article VI in Annex I to GATT 1994 which permits such different
treatment "in the case of imports from a country which has  complete or substantially complete
monopoly of its trade  and where all domestic prices are fixed by the State" (Palmeter, 1998,
p.1 16).
These practices perhaps were fully justified when practically all trade was controlled by
state trading enterprises or Ministries under central planning and prices were fixed by the State and
hence  could not be taken to reflect "normal  value". Many, but not all, of the FSU countries have
made great progress in introducing market forces and eliminating state trading in recent years. It
would very difficult to argue that Ukraine or  Russia at present have "a substantially complete
monopoly on trade" or that "all domestic prices are fixed by the State" as required under the WTO.
Continuation of the traditional EC and US anti-dumping practices in the new setting no longer
22appears justified for many of the countries which have done away with significant state trading
practices.  0
WTO membership would address the problem non- market economies have regarding the
different standards imposed by  EU  on  safeguards. WTO  membership, however,  would not
automatically terminate the designation of countries in transition as non-market economies, nor
completely terminate the problems  they have with anti-dumping.  But it might help, as membership
would inhibit the most egregious excesses in anti-dumping  practices against which a non-member
has no recourse, as the WTO dispute settlement mechanism-albeit  with some limitations, can be
utilised for this purpose.
More generally, the standards of accession have evolved in such a way as to  provide
members with assurances that a newly acceding  country fundamentally  is run on market principles,
making current antidumping practices, if not illegal, demonstrably unfair. It can be reasonably
assumed  that  transition  economies would  not  secure WTO  membership unless  they  could
demonstrate that their trade was fundamentally  based on market transactions and the state did not
have a substantially complete monopoly on trade, as required in the WTO provisions regarding the
use  of  alternate  procedures  in  anti-dumping cases.  Thus,  in  practice,  WTO  membership
undoubtedly would tend to  create pressure to termninate  the non-market designation in national
practices of antidumping and permit all WTO members to be treated the same in major markets.
Unfortunately,  this has not happened so far. In 1999, the EU continues to consider both the Kyrgyz
Republic and Mongolia "non-market" economies, although  they are WTO members and the role of
the state in their economies is probably less than in many developing countries, WTO members.
101n  early  1998, the  EUannounced liberalization  measures  on this issue  vis- a- vis Russia  and  China,
which terminated  their designation  as "non-market"  economies  at the country  level and would permit
determinations  to be made on a case by case basis,  that would  take into account  the market conditions
prevailing  in each  product in which  dumping  has  been  alleged Such  a case by case approach  has also  been
used  by the US.
23V. WTO Membership and Accession
WTO  membership is  important for a number of reasons: first, because  membership
promotes  the establishment of the legal framework and market based  institutions in support of
international trade that were absent under central planning; second, because WTO membership
provides better guarantees for market access through  the provision of unconditional MFN status-
-something  that  some  transition  economies do  not  enjoy  in  all  markets;  and  through  the
avoidance of arbitrary measures that limit market access to non-members (as noted above in sec-
tion IV); and third, because the WTO has established a binding dispute settlement mechanism,
which, at least so far, has proved effective in adjudicating trade disputes.
The process of accession to the WTO has been complex, prolonged and difficult for most
countries. The average time for accession  was more than five years  for the last six countries which
became WTO members. The process has two major components: (a) a fact finding phase, which
aims at determining  whether the acceding  country has in place laws and regulations consistent with
obligations that it will be assuming under the WTO agreements; (b) a negotiation phase, in which
countries are asked to make legally binding commitments regarding their tariff schedule on all
goods, a separate set of commitments on agriculture  (which includes a more complex set of
commitments involving e.g. aggregate  domestic support), and services. Formally, the discussions
are conducted under a "Working Party" established by the WTO-but  at the negotiations phase,
they involve a large number of bilateral negotiations  with important trading partners. At the end of
the process the Working Party issues a draft report for consideration and approval by the WTO
Council."
Most CEE countries are members of the WTO. Some, such as Hungary,  Poland and
Romania became contracting parties to the GATT in the 1970's and 1980's, the latter two  under
special protocols and despite serious concerns as to whether their commitments, for example
regarding tariffs,  were  meaningful in  the  context  of  central planning  (Haus  1992).  These
countries renegotiated their GATT protocols and became founding members of WTO. Similarly,
11 For a detailed discussion see Michalopoulos, 1998;  for  a recent update, WTO, 1999b.
24Czechoslovakia (like Cuba), an original  contracting party of the GATT, ostensibly continued its
adherence to the agreement throughout its central planning period, with the Czech Republic and
Slovakia becoming  subsequently members of the WTO. Finally, Slovenia and Bulgaria applied
to accede to the GATT and ultimately became WTO members in 1995 and 1996 respectively. In
addition,  Albania , Croatia and the FYR Macedonia are currently applying to accede to the
WTO.  The latter' s application is at the very early stages while Croatia is at the last, negotiation
stage.  This  leaves  only  the  remaining ex-Yugoslav  republics  without prospects  for  WTO
membership in the near future.2
Table 5 shows the current status of WTO accessions for transition economies and other
countries  applying for WTO accession. The following summarises the situation in the CEE and
FSU:
*  The Kyrgyz Republic and Latvia, became members recently; Estonia accession has been
approved  but had not been ratified by its parliament, as of the time of this writing.
*  Armenia, Croatia, Georgia,  Lithuania and possibly Albania and Moldova are at late stages
in their negotiations ( as evidenced by draft working party reports already prepared  or in
preparation),  with two or more (probably Croatia and Georgia) having reasonable prospects
for WTO accession by the end of 1999. This date is of importance, because in November
1999 there is a WTO Ministerial meeting that is expected to launch a new round of trade
negotiations. Unless  these  countries accede by  then, they  can  not  take  part  in  the
negotiations. Moreover, during rounds of trade negotiations,  little effort is made to process
accessions, as the basic agreements  and commitments are in the process of being revised.
*  Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia and Ukraine are at earlier stages of negotiation and will not gain
accession by end 1999.
12 Bosnia -Herzegovina and the  former Yugoslav  Republic have also applied to accede.  But their
applications are not under active consideration  at  present.
25*  Azerbaijan, FYR  of Macedonia and Uzbekistan, have had working parties set up  only
recently and their accession process is at the very early stages.
*  Tajikistan and Turkmenistan  have not yet applied to accede.
Broadly speaking the more rapidly countries have moved to introduce market oriented
reforms and liberal trade policies, the closer they are to becoming members of the WTO. The
countries in Central Asia which are laggards  in market oriented reforms are also lagging in terms of
WTO accession. Also, smaller countries typically have found accession negotiations easier. In part
this is because the smaller the country, the more likely it is that it can ill afford a protective regime;
and because small countries typically  poses fewer market access issues for major WTO members.
Table 5
Timetable of Accessions to the WTO
Government  WP  Memorandum  Tariff Offers  1  Service  T  Draft  Working
___Istablishment  . I  Offers  [  Party  Report
Former  Soviet  Union  l
Armenia  12/93  04/95  01/99  10/98, 01/99  02/99
Azerbaijan  07/97  04/99  - - -
Belarus  10/93  01/96  03/98  - -
Estonia  03/94  03/94  08/95, 02/99  04/95  11/98*
Georgia  07/96  04/97  02/98, 12/98  02/08, 09/98  -
Kazakstan  02/96  09/96  06/97  09/97
Lithuania  02/94  12/94  10195, 021
99 04/95  10/98
Moldova  12/93  09/96  03/98, 01/99  02/98, 10/98  -
Russian Federation  06/93  03/94  02/98  - -
Ukraine  12/93  07/94  05/96  07/98, 10/98  -
Uzbekistan  12/94  09/98-  - -
Other  Countries  in  Transition  l
Albania  12/92  01/95  05/97, 01/99  05/97,11/98  -
Cambodia  12/94  - - - -
China  03/87  02/87, 09/93  04/94  09/94, 11/97  12/94
26Government  WP  Memorandum  Tariff Offers  Service  | Draft  Working
Establishment  Offers  I Pan,  Report  I
Other Countries in Transition(continuaton)
Croatia  10/93  06/94  04197,  04/98  05/97, 11/98  08/98
FYR Macedonia  12/94  04/99  - - -
Laos  02/98  -
Vietnam  01/95  09/96
Others
Algeeia  06/87  07/96  l
Andorra  10/97  03/99  - -
Jordan  01/94  10/94  07/98, 10/99  01/99
Lebanon  01/99  - - -
Nepal  06/89  02/90  - l
Oman  06/96  10/96  10/97  10/97, 03/98
Samoa  07/98  - -
Saudi Arabia  07/93  07/94  09/97  09/97
Seychelles  07/95  08/96  06/97  05/97
Sudan  10/94  01/99  - -
Chinese Taipei  09/92  10/92  02/96  09/94,10/98  03/98
Tonga  11/95  05/98  -
Vanuatu  07/95  11/95  06/97  09/97
*Accession  completed; awaiting ratification
Source:  WTO,  1999b
Nonetheless, delays and problems have arisen for all countries  and  in all phases of the
process. Some are due to the inherent complexities of enacting legislation and regulations that bring
into conformnity  the regimes of transition economies with WTO rules.  These extend far beyond the
obvious such as the Law on Customs, the Tariff schedule and related regulations on imports and
exports. They include such items as the laws on joint stock companies, the Central Bank and credit
institutions, licensing of economic activity, domestic taxation, regulations on food and alcoholic
beverages, veterinary medicine and pests subject to quarantine, patent and copyright protection,
consumer protection etc. Design and enactment of all this legislation and regulations are quite
demanding on the institutions of the acceding countries. But  the WTO accession process provides
27a useful stimulus for the review and consistency of a lot of these matters which may not have
otherwise  happened.
There are some issues which are especially difficult  in transition economy accessions
which have also caused delays. These include the degree of privatization in the economy and the
extent to which government agencies involved in the regulation of economic activity do so on the
basis  of transparent rules and criteria as opposed to  administrative discretion.  Both of these
concerns emanate from the dominant role that the state previously played-and  in some cases, e. g
Belarus, still does-- in the economies of these countries. While the WTO agreements  have no
explicit requirement that  a  member must  have fundamentally a  market  economy," 3 such a
requirement is being imposed de facto by existing members as part of the leverage they have in the
accession process for new members. In some cases, e.g. Russia there have been concerns relating
to the jurisdiction and capacity of national agencies to implement policies on which commitments
are being made. The fundamental concern is one of governance:  do the government agencies have
the authority and capacity to implement the commitments that they are making in the context of
WTO accession regarding the laws and regulations that concern the conduct of international  trade?
A related concern arises about the role and jurisdiction of local authorities and whether they  have
the right and opportunity to  nullify the commitments made by the national authorities in the
context of accession negotiations.
The negotiations phase can, and frequently has been, the most time-consuming phase of
accession.  Delays can occur because of attitudes and policies of acceding countries as well as
because  of demands of WTO members.
(a)  Acceding Government Strategy and Tactics.  Within the rules and disciplines of the
WTO, each country has considerable scope as to how restrictive or liberal its trade regime will be.
13 GA7  TArticle  XVlI calls  for notification  of enterprises engaging in state trading practices. However,
Article XVII had never been intended to address  problems that come up when the bulk of external trade was
controlled by the state. Indeed the old GA  1T accommodated  under special protocols several countries, e.g
Romania and Czechoslovakia  which at the time had centrally  planned economies.
28The key decisions countries have to make relate to the level at which countries bind their tariffs, the
support they provide to agriculture  and the range of commitments in the liberalization of the service
trade.  Broadly speaking the more liberal the tariff regime-i.e.  the lower the tariffs, the less the
support provided to agriculture, and the greater the number of commitments countries are prepared
to make in the area of services, the easier the accession negotiation. Among the FSU economies,
the ones that have already become WTO members (Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia) as well as the ones
which have made the greater progress and which can reasonably  be expected to accede to the WTO
in 1999, such as, Armenia, Estonia, and  Georgia are countries with fundamentally liberal trade
regimes with significant progress in introducing market reforms. These countries have used the
WTO accession as a vehicle to legally bind their tariff structure at reasonably low levels, close to
their currently applied rates and make a significant number of commitments in opening up their
service sectors.
The  other four countries, ( Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, Ukraine), which are also at the
negotiations stage, have pursued a somewhat different strategy, in part because they  feel that
significant levels of protection are necessary during a transition period during which restructuring
of inefficient state enterprises and service sectors can be undertaken." 4 Accordingly they have
presented initial offers that  propose to  bind tariffs at rates much higher than those currently
applied,  leave a  number  of  sectors unbound, and/or offered to  make few  commnitments  in
maintaining their service sectors open. This strategy is also motivated by tactical considerations.
Since at accession applicants can not typically negotiate improvements  in  their own market access,
it may  be  desirable  to try to maintain significant levels of  protection, which they can use as
bargaining chips to obtain improved access in future negotiating rounds. Their strategy appears  to
involve liberalising as little as minimally necessary  to ensure accession.
Belarus and, increasingly Kazakstan, have been trying to pattern their negotiations after
Russia, because of their strong trade links and proposed customs union.  Kazakstan had tabled a
tariff offer on goods in June 1997, which however, was not deemed as  an acceptable basis for
negotiations by members of the working party-and  little progress has been made since. Both
14 See G. Gabunia "Reasonable  Protectionism" Expert, Sept. 7, 1998, #33.
29Russia and Belarus submitted tariff offers-containing  a large number of ceiling bindings as well
as unbound items, in February and March 1998 respectively,  which led to some preliminary and
rather difficult negotiations. Russia was invited to put forth an offer on services, but as of mid-
1999 had not done so. There is  strong evidence that for a variety of reasons, both political and
economic, Russia's accession has lost its dynamic. Struggles between the executive and the Duma
over legislation,  the rising influence of economic elite in the service sector-whose  interests might
adversely be affected by a liberal service offer, and continued uncertainty in the relations between
the centre and the regions are key reasons (Buchalova, 1998); and they will adversely affect the
pace of accession  of the other two countries.
Ukraine has been pursuing a similar, though separate approach to its negotiations. In some
respects its discussions are more advanced, since it has tabled an initial and revised offer on
services; but its tariff offer on goods is a preliminary one, dating to 1996. Given where these four
countries are in their negotiations, they will be unable to accede to the WTO by the end of 1999.
The same is true for the remaining FSU countries and the FYR of Macedonia which are at even
earlier stages of negotiations.
(b) WTO Member Attitudes and Policies. Acceding countries are not solely responsible for
delays in accession. WTO members have played their part as well. In many respects, the demands
made for newly acceding countries are greater than the disciplines on existing members at similar
levels of development (Michalopoulos, 1998, Drabek 1996). Acceding countries are requested to
bind  all tariffs-while  many developing countries, whose level of economic and  institutional
development is similar, continue to have  a large portion of their tariff schedule unbound outside
agriculture. In agriculture, meaningful calculation  of commitments for FSU countries is subject to
serious statistical difficulties. 15
15Accession  involves  in  part commitments  to aggregate  measures  of support  to agriculture  relative  to a
"representative"  period, usually  the three  years  prior to the application  for accession.  Such commitments
are usually  based  on data which  contain  serious  statistical  and economic  pifalls. For example,  the three
years  prior  to the accession  applicationfrequently  coincide  with the early  1990's  when  these  countries  were
in the midst of hyperinflation  and their exchange  rates were unstable  and could hardly be viewed as
representing  "equilibrium".  Similar  problems  arise  if the  late eighties  are used  as "representative".
30Acceding countries are also typically requested to meet  all commitments at entry, for
example with  regard to  TRIPs, customs valuation,  standards or  sanitary and phytosanitary
regulations; without time limits - such as those available to existing members at similar levels of
development; and regardless of whether institutional  weaknesses  make it difficult for them to fulfill
such commitments.  These weaknesses relate broadly to aspects of the operations of a market
economy, where it takes time to establish the proper institutional infrastructure that would enable
them to discharge their responsibilities properly  under the WTO agreements.  There are many
examples of such areas: the development of appropriate  legislation and institutions for intellectual
and other property rights  protection, the establishment of a suitable regulatory environment for
standards or phytosanitary controls,  regulatory aspects of provision of financial services  etc.
While the insistence of WTO members on a liberal commercial  policy at entry is likely to
serve both  acceding countries'  long  term  development interests as well  as  WTO members'
commercial objectives, insistence on adherence  to all the WTO commitments at entry and without
transition periods in areas such as customs valuation, TRIPS, standards and SPS where there are
obvious  institutional weaknesses in  transition economies raises a  serious problem. Acceding
countries, because of their strong desire for membership, may end up agreeing to obligations which,
later on, their weak institutional capacity would make it difficult to implement-leaving  them open
to subsequent complaints.
Sometimes, as in the case of some of the Baltic countries,  the delays have resulted not so
much from the accession to the WTO per se, but from the links between commitments related to
the WTO, e.g. in the area of agriculture or services and the possible future association of the
countries with  the  EU. For  example, Estonia, with  a  currently very  liberal trade  regime in
agriculture,  has had  to propose much higher ceiling bindings in agricultural products, otherwise the
EU, consistent with GATT Article XXIV, would have to had to "compensate"  its trading partners
at the time of Estonia's entry to the EU for the increase in its level of protection.  Both Estonia's and
Latvia's accession have had to come to grips with EU-US disagreements over the  appropriate
commitments in the audio-visual service sector.
31More generally, perhaps the most  important factor for the delays associated with WTO
negotiations is  that the political economy of international  trade policy is dominated by  particular
commercial interests in all countries. Thus, while at a general policy level WTO members might
agree that accession of a country to  the WTO is  of paramount importance to their national
interest-and  for some large countries such as China and Russia  to the very operation of the
international  trade system-accession  can not occur until the particular commercial interests in all
countries are satisfied; and that takes time.
Even when countries have become WTO members, problems remain. When Mongolia and
the Kyrgyz Republic became WTO members the US exercised its right of non-application under
WTO's  Article XVIm-which  means that it does not provide these countries with unconditional
MFN-or  for that matter with any other WTO rights and thus de  facto has not accepted their
accession. This  is obviously an  important issue that the US has to address through amended
legislation before WTO membership negotiations of important trading countries such Russia and
China are meaningfully concluded.
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations
The analysis of trade policies, market access and EU and WTO membership of countries in
the CEE and FSU suggests that, with few  exceptions, transition economies in CEE have become
well integrated in  the multilateral trading  system. Their  specific trade regimes  are currently
different, but almost all are tending towards integration at different timetables with the EU. In the
FSU, this is true only for the Baltic countries. For the others, the one most integrated in the
multilateral system is the Kyrgyz Republic, which has become a WTO member with a liberal trade
regime, and whose government appears also to be interested in some type of association with the
EU. A number of countries in the FSU, such as Armenia, Georgia and Moldova are close behind.
All these countries need to continue to make efforts to strengthen their institutional capabilities in
such areas as financial sector development, customs administration and trade facilitation, which
would make them better able to enjoy the benefits and  meet the responsibilities of effective
participation  in the WTO and the multilateral system more generally.
32The momentum for market and trade reforms in some of the larger FSU countries (Russia
and Ukraine) has  stalled, and Belarus has gone backward. While their trade regimes (with some
exceptions, e.g. Belarus), are not particularly restrictive,  weakness in the operations of fundamental
market institutions inhibit effective integration in the trading system.  It is not that the state is
controlling  prices or output decisions. Rather that the market support systems as well as the systems
of governance are weak, resulting in de facto barriers to trade. These problems, combined with
persistent protective pressures have inhibited progress and accession to the WTO. As long as that
is the case, they will continue to face disadvantages  and discriminatory  treatment in major markets.
Azerbaijan is a special case: its trade regime is not currently restrictive. But it started its reforms
late, applied to the WTO late and has faced specific market access issues in the US.
The remaining countries in Central Asia, Uzbekistan,  Tadjikistan and Turkmenistan,  as well
as Belarus, have a long way to go in introducing market oriented reforms and institutions as well as
the kind  of trade  liberalisation needed for  effective integration in  the  international system..
Although Uzbekistan has  made some  progress in this  regard, including applying for  WTO
accession, its  regime continues to  be  imbued by  an  interventionist philosophy and extensive
administrative  controls and licensing.
While the bulk of the reform and adjustment effort must be made by the FSU countries,
WTO members and especially the US and EU need to make some changes as well. First, both need
to review their policy regarding "non market economies" as it relates to anti-dumping  and in the EU
case, safeguards, to ensure that countries where market decisions prevail-however  imperfect the
markets may be-are  not subjected to even more opaque and non-transparent  procedures than those
normally associated with anti-dumping practices; and are not encouraged to enter into cartel like
price fixing arrangements.  This should be done immediately and irrespective of the status of WTO
negotiations. Second,  countries which have gone through the WTO accession process can be
judged to  be  "market" economies and  should be excluded from the  "non-market" procedures
applied in anti-dumping and safeguard  measures.  Third, the US has a special problem regarding the
33need to repeal the Jackson-Vanik amendment, so as to permit a meaningful implementation of its
commitments to countries acceding  to the WTO.
Fourth, consideration  should be given to extending the time frames-but  not deviating from
the principles-regarding  the implementation of commitments in  WTO areas where transition
economies'  institutions  are  weak-e.g.  TRIPS,  phytosanitary and  other  standards,  customs
valuation.  Whereas more  technical assistance than  currently provided to  these  countries to
strengthen their capabilities in this area may be needed, it should be recognised that technical
assistance alone does not build institutions and that the latter take time to put in place and become
effective.
Finally, as many of these countries  will be unable to become members before the launching
of the new WTO Round of multilateral negotiations,  arrangements will have to be made for their
effective participation in the Round as observers. There are precedents for this under the GATT
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. Such arrangements would probably require that
they commit to a standstill in trade measures,  just like other participants in the Round. While they
may not be able to participate in the give and take of the actual negotiations, it would be possible
several of the countries, including Kazakstan,  Russia and Ukraine as well as the smaller FSU states
that are close to acceding,  to follow the negotiations  and adjust their own policies as necessary, so
as to permit them to become members at the end of the Round. It is conceivable that they could
accede during the Round, but it would be difficult, especially because once the Round gets under
way the focus of  attention shifts to  the negotiations under the Round. One way or the other
however, they need to ensure that they do what it is necessary for accession at least by the end of
the next Round, so as to be able to participate  more effectively in the multilateral trading system.
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37Appendix
Trade among the Countries of the Former Soviet Union, 1990-93
(in constant 1990 Roubles)
Millions of 1990 Rubles  1990  1991  1992  1993
Exports  Inports  Exports  Imports  Exports  imports  Exports  Imports
Armenia  3,428  3,508  1,835  2,407  1,294  851  554  622
Azerbaijan  6,105  4,247  4,575  3,685  2,318  1,716  1,124  863
Belarus  17,224  14,841  12,415  11,152  9,659  8,488  7,349  6,895
Estonia  2,468  2,803  1,928  1,603  732  620  414  282
Georgia  5,724  4,949  2,723  2,532  662  951  617  835
Kazakstan  8,443  14,314  7,231  9,140  6,928  10,065  4,610  6,609
Kyrgyz Republic  2,445  3,179  2,605  2,248  1,193  1,261  595  709
Latvia  5,028  4,711  3,116  2,377  2,479  1,912  734  596
Lithuania  6,575  6,509  4,741  3,422  2,287  2,432  1,372  969
Moldova  5,853  4,992  2,991  2,962  1,558  1,815  1,373  1,389
Russia  74,710  67,284  58,837  42,915  42,464  37,006  27,493  23,280
Tajikislan  2,377  3,359  1,621  2,284  423  735  245  371
Turkmenistan  2,469  2,923  2,614  1,910  2,496  2,192  1,425  1,910
Ukraine  38.319  38,989  27,342  32,970  17,722  26,152  10,878  18,615
Uzbekistan  8,169  11,864  6,642  7,371  2,989  3,639  2,874  3,213
Forner  Soviet Union  189,337  188,472  141,216  128,978  95,204  99,834  61,657  67,158
Source:  Reproducedfrom  Michalopoulos  and  Tarr  [1994], pp.  4-5.  For  an explanation  of the methodology,  see
Michalopoulos  and  Tarr [1994],  Appendix  on Foreign  Trade Statistics,  pp.  21-2 7.
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